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Abstract
We partially characterize a class of symmetric, monotonic, Bayes-Nash equilibria to a uniform-price sealed-bid auction in
an environment in which each demander wishes to purchase multiple units. Ó 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
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1. Introduction
In many multi-unit auctions, the typical demander wishes to buy more than one unit from the set of
objects being sold. The theoretical literature on auctions, however, has mostly studied environments in
2 which each bidder can obtain at most one unit. We model here a simple multi-unit uniform-price
sealed-bid auction in an environment in which demanders have independent private valuations for
obtaining up to two of the k identical units sold. The units are awarded to the k highest bidders, each
of whom pays a per-unit price equal to the kth highest bid. We partially characterize the class of
symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria in which bids are strictly monotonically increasing in valuations.
2. Model and deﬁnitions
A seller offers k ( $2) identical units for sale. There are n 11( .(k/2)) demanders, indexed by i.
ii i i Each demander i draws a pair of valuations v and v , where v $v , from a common probability 12 1 2
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distribution G(v ,v ) with density function g(v ,v ). Assume that G(0,0)50 and G(1,1)51. G, n and 12 12
i k are common knowledge but v is known privately to demander i for j 51,2 and for all i. j
ii Each demander submits two bids simultaneously. b and b denote the two bids of bidder i and the 12
ii bids are labelled so that b $b . The bidders who make the k highest bids are each awarded a number 12
of items equal to the number of bids they have among the top k and pay a per-unit price equal to the
3 kth highest bid.
A pure strategy is a mapping from valuations into bids B(v ,v )5(B (v ,v ), B (v ,v )); 12 112 212
22 1 [0,1] ®R where B (v ,v )$B (v ,v ), ;v ,v . A strategy B(v ,v ) is said to be separable if 112 212 12 12
B ( v , v ) 5 ( B ( v ), B (v )), that is, if the demander’s bid for his higher (lower) valued unit is 12 11 22
independent of his lower (higher) valuation. A strategy B(v ,v )i sstrictly monotonic if (­B (v ,v )/ 12 j12
­ v ) . 0 for j 51,2 and for all v , and is weakly monotonic if (­B (v ,v )/­v)$0 for j 51,2 and for jj j 12 j
all v .ABayes-Nash equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies in which each player maximizes her j
expected payoff given the strategies of the other bidders. The equilibrium is symmetric if each player
is using the same strategy. Since only symmetric equilibria are considered here, B(v ,v ) designates 12
B both a strategy and a strategy proﬁle. Let the probability distribution F (x ) be the distribution of the nn
n th order statistic of the 2n bids made by n bidders using the strategy B(v ,v ). x denotes the nth 12 n
B lowest (or alternatively the 2n 2v 11st highest) of the 2n bids. Let f (x ) denote the corresponding nn
density function.
3. Results
Lemma 1 shows that if an equilibrium strategy is strictly monotonic, then (i) it must be separable,
and (ii) each bidder must always submit bids less than or equal to her valuations.
B* Lemma 1. If B*(v ,v ) is a strictly monotone symmetric equilibrium strategy, and F (x ) is twice 12 nn
** differentiable for n 52n 2k 11,2n 2k 12,2n 2k 13, then (i) B*(v ,v )5(B (v ), B (v )), and (ii) 1 2 11 22
* B ( v # v ; j 5 1,2; ;v [[0,1]. jj j j
i Proof. Let B*(v ,v ) be a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, bidder i chooses b , 12 1
i iii b $ 0 to maximize expected proﬁt, denoted by Ep (b ,b ), and given by: 2 12
i b 2
i i B i i i Bi Bi ** * E ( v 1 v 2 2 x ) f ( x )dx 1(v 1v 22b )(F (b )2F (b )) 12 2 n 2 k 1 32 n 2 k 1 32 n 2 k 1 32 n 2 k 1 31 2 2 2 n 2 k 1 22 2 n 2 k 1 32
0
i b 1
i B i i Bi Bi ** * 5 E ( v 2 x ) f ( x )dx 1(v 2b )(F (b )2F (b )). (1) 12 n 2 k 1 22 n 2 k 1 22 n 2 k 1 22 n 2 k 1 21 1 2 n 2 k 1 11 2 n 2 k 1 21
i b 2
The ﬁrst term in (1) corresponds to the case when the purchase price (the kth highest of all 2n12
bids) is lower than bidder i’s lower bid, in which case bidder i receives two units and pays a per-unit
3Ties for the kth highest bid are broken by allocating the tied unit(s) to each of the tied bidders with equal probability. If
there are d bids tied for the last c units, each of the tied bids is accepted with probability (c/d). Ties occur with probability
zero in the type of equilibria considered in this paper.T. Draaisma, C. Noussair / Economics Letters 56 (1997) 157–162 159
price equal to the k22nd highest bid submitted by the other n bidders. The second term corresponds
to the case in which the per-unit purchase price equals bidder i’s lower bid, in which case bidder i
receives two units. The third term is the case when the purchase price is lower than bidder i’s higher
bid and higher than bidder i’s lower bid, in which case bidder i receives one unit at a price equal to
the k21st highest of the other players’ bids. The fourth term comprises the case when the purchase
price equals bidder i’s higher bid, in which case bidder i receives one unit. If the purchase price is
higher than bidder i’s higher bid, i receives zero units and the payoff to i is zero.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are:
i ­Ep ii B i B i B i i ] ] ** * 5 ( v 2 b ) f ( b ) 2 j ( F ( b )(F (b )) 5 0i fb .0 ij j 2 n 2 k 1 jj 2 n 2 k 1 jj 2 n 2 k 1 j 1 1jj ­ b (2) j
i # if b 50, j
ii i * for j51,2. Setting b equal to B (v ,v ) must be a solution to (2). The derivative of the ﬁrst order jj 12
condition with respect to v is: j
B** * * d f( B ( v , v )) ­B (v ,v ) ­B (v ,v ) 2n2k1jj12 j 12 j 12 i B * ]]]]]]]]]] ** ]]]] (v 2B (v ,v )) 2 jf (B (v ,v )) jj 12 2 n 2 k 1 jj12 * ­ v ­ v d B jj j
** ­ B ( v , v ) ­ B ( v , v ) j 12 j 12 B B **]]]] ]]]] ** 1 jf (B (v ,v )) 1 1 1 f (B (v ,v )) 5 0, (3) SD 2 n 2 k 1 j 1 1 j 12 2 n 2 k 1 jj12 ­ v ­ v jj
* for B .0. This can be rewritten as: j
* ­Bj ]] ­vj
B** 2 f( B ( v , v )) 2n2k1jj12 ]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]] 5 . B** d f( B ( v , v )) 2n2k1jj12 iB B * ]]]]]] ** * * ( v 2 B ( v , v )) 2 (11j)f (B (v ,v )) 1 jf (B (v ,v )) jj 12 2 n 2 k 1 jj12 2 n 2 k 1 1 1 jj12 * d B j
(4)
Since the density function f $0 and B* is strictly monotonic, it must be the case that f .0, 2n2k1j 2n2k1j
implying that the numerator of (4) is strictly less than zero. The denominator is therefore strictly less
45 than zero by the assumption of strict monotonicity. Since f .0, and the function f is 2n2k1j 2n2k1j
4Notice that the second derivatives of the proﬁt function are given by:
Bi 2 * d f ( b ) ­ E p 2 n 2 k 1 jj i ii B i B i ] ]]]]] ** 5 ( v 2 b )2 (11j)f (b )1jf (b ) (5) jj 2 n 2 k 1 jj 2 n 2 k 1 j 1 1j i 2 i ­ b d b jj
for j51,2 and
2 i 2 i ­ Ep ­ Ep
]] ]] 55 0 (6) ii ii ­ b ­ b­ b ­ b 12 21
Since the denominator of (4) is the same expression as in equation (5), (5) must be ,0, indicating that the second order
* necessary conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed by any solution to (2) if B is strictly monotonic. j
5 iB i * A weakly monotonic symmetric equilibrium strategy proﬁle can have a ﬂat portion at some b .0 only if f (b )50. j 2n2k1jj
This is seen by noticing that the left side of (4) can equal 0 only if the numerator of the right side equals 0.160 T. Draaisma, C. Noussair / Economics Letters 56 (1997) 157–162
i derived only from the strategies chosen by players other than i, equation (2) indicates that b must be 1
ii i independent of v and that b must be independent of v . From equation (2), it also follows that since 22 1
ii i * ( F ( b ) 2 F ( b ))$0 and f (b ).0 that B (v )#v . h 2n2k1jj 2 n 2 k 1 j 1 1j 2 n 2 k 1 jj j j j
Proposition 1 gives precise necessary conditions for a symmetric, strictly monotonic strategy proﬁle
to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
¯ Proposition 1. The strategy proﬁle consisting of each player using the strategy B(v ,v ) is a strictly 12
¯ monotone symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy only if B(v ,v ) equals b(v ,v )5(b (v ), 12 12 11
b ( v )), where b(v ,v ) satisﬁes: 22 12
O H ( V ( b ( v )),V (b (v )),g,m,n,l) l,m:2l1m52n2k1j 1 jj 2 jj ]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]] b (v )5v 2j ; j 51,2 (7) jj j 2 n ­ H ( ? ) ­ H ( ? )
] ] 9 ] ] 9 OO V ( b ( v )) 1 V (b (v )) SD q 5 2 n 2 k 1 jl , m :2l1m5q 1 jj 2 jj ­ V ­ V 12
2 1 with initial conditions b (1)51 and b (0)50, where V(x)5b (x), and where: 12 jj
H ( z , z , g , m , n , l ) 5 12
zz z m l 12 12 11 n 2 m 2 l
n !
]]]]] EEg(v ,v )dv dv EEg(v ,v )dv dv EEg(v ,v )dv dv . 12 2 1 12 2 1 12 2 1 12 l ! m !(n 2m 2l)! 12 12
zz z 00 0 11 2
(8)
¯¯ ¯ Proof. Suppose all bidders are using a symmetric proﬁle of strategies, B(v ,v )5(B (v ), B (v )), 12 11 22
¯ which satisﬁes the necessary condition (2). Consider some bidder y±i. Since B (v ) is strictly jj
monotone increasing in v , it is invertible, and we can deﬁne the probability the bidder y submits two j
i ¯ bids, one bid, and zero bids less than or equal to b as equalling respectively: j
21 i 21 i ¯¯ ¯¯ B ( b ) B ( b ) 1j2j
yi yi ¯¯ ¯¯ Prob[b #b ,b #b ]5 EE g ( v , v )dv dv , 2 j 1 j 12 2 1
00
2 1 i ¯¯ B ( b ) 2j 1
yi yi ¯¯ ¯¯ Prob[b #b ,b .b ]5 EE g ( v , v )dv dv , 2 j 1 j 12 2 1
2 1i 0 ¯¯ B ( b ) 1j
and
11
yi yi ¯¯ ¯¯ Prob[b .b ,b .b ]5 EE g ( v , v )dv dv , 2 j 1 j 12 2 1
2 1i 2 1i ¯¯ ¯¯ B ( b ) B ( b ) 1j2j
¯ B F ( x ), is then the summation of H(?), where H is as deﬁned in equation (8), over all combinations nn
of l and m such that n#2l1m#2n, and such that l, m$0. Then,T. Draaisma, C. Noussair / Economics Letters 56 (1997) 157–162 161
2n
¯ Bi 2 1i 2 1i ¯¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ F ( b ) 5 OOH ( B ( b ), B (b ), g, m, n, l)( 9 ) n j 1 j 2 j
q 5 n l , m :2l1m5q
It then follows easily that
21 i 21 i 2n ¯¯ ¯¯ d B ( b )d B ( b ) ­ H ­ H ¯ 1 j 2 j Bi ¯ ] ] ]]] ]]]]] f (b )5OO 1 n j 2 1 i 2 1 i 12 ¯¯¯¯ q 5 n ­ B d b ­ B d b l , m :2l1m5q 1 j 2 j
and that
¯¯ Bi B i 2 1i 2 1i ¯ ¯ ¯¯ ¯¯ F ( b ) 2 F( b ) 5O H ( B ( b ),B (b ), g, m, n, l). n j n11 j 1 j 2 j
l,m:2l1m5n
Substituting into (2) and rearranging terms results in (7).
6 ¯¯ We now show that B (1)51. Consider the necessary condition (2) evaluated at B (1). 1 1 ¯ ¯¯ B BB ¯¯ ¯ f ( B (1)).0 by strict monotonicity. We need to show that F (B (1))2F (B (1))50. 2n2k111 2 n 2 k 1 11 2 n 2 k 1 21
¯¯ BB ¯¯ F ( B (1))2F (B (1)) 2n2k111 2 n 2 k 1 21
2 1 l ¯¯ B ( B (1)) 1 21
n !
]]]]] 5 OE E g ( v , v )dv dv 12 2 1 12 l ! m !(n 2m 2l)! l,m:2l1m52n2k11
00
m 2 1 ¯¯ B ( B (1)) 1 21 1 n 2 m 2 l
3 EEg ( v , v )dv dv EEg ( v , v )dv dv . (10) 12 2 1 12 2 1 12 12
2 1 10 1 ¯¯ B ( B (1)) 21
This expression equals zero unless m50, n2m2l50 and 2l1m52n2k11. These last three
statements can simultaneously be true only if k51. ((m50, n2m2l50, 2l1m52n2k11)Þ(n5l,
2l52n2k11)Þ(2n52n2k11)Þ(k51)). Since we assume that k.1, the expression equals 0 for
all relevant parameters.
¯ A similar argument can be used to show that b (0)50. Consider (2) evaluated at B (0). Since 22 ¯ B 2 1 ¯¯ ¯ f ( B (0)).0, it sufﬁces to show that o H(B (B (0)), 0, g, m, n, l)50. The 2n2k122 l , m :2l1m52n2k121 2
expression equals 0 unless m50, l50 and 2l1m52n2k12. These last three events can only occur
simultaneously if 2n125k. Since 2n12.k (there are more valuations than units) the expression
equals 0 for all relevant parameters. h
4. Concluding remarks
We have derived precise necessary conditions for a symmetric proﬁle of strategies to be a strictly
monotonic Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a simple auction game. Strict monotonicity comprises an
interesting class of equilibria to consider, since it has the reasonable property that demanders with
ii ii higher valuations submit higher bids. In equilibrium, each demander must submit b #v and b #v . 11 22
6 ¯¯ It also must be the case that B (0)50 by the fact that B (v )#v and the non-negativity constraint on bids. 1 jj j162 T. Draaisma, C. Noussair / Economics Letters 56 (1997) 157–162
ii The underrevelation (b ,v ) occurs for purely non-cooperative reasons, and does not require any jj
collusion on the part of bidders. The equilibrium strategy must be separable because the trade-offs
i i determining the choice of b are independent of the valuations of bidder i other than v (though they j j
i do depend on the strategies of players other than i). Increasing b increases the probability of j
ii acceptance of b , but not of i’s other bids. Lowering b reduces the price paid for all of the units i jj
i receives in the event that b is the kth highest bid overall, but the beneﬁt from a lower price depends j
i only on j, the rank of the bid (and therefore how many of i’s bids are accepted in the event that b is j
the marginal bid), and not on the actual amount of demander i’s valuations.
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